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Abstract
Since the advent of the World Wide Web, “the Internet has emerged as a shopping channel with
undeniable power to facilitate and increase sales of a growing range of products” (Ernst & Young, Special
Report, 1998). With commercial activity on the Internet gaining momentum, and with technological
developments involving more secure means of making payments, sending documents, and verifying the identity
of the consumer, electronic malls are opening up a new vista of opportunities.
We study the competition between two competing marketing channels: online stores and traditional retail
stores, and focus on profitability and expansion of marketing channels as a function of consumer
characteristics and stores’ cost structure. A consumer’s choice of a store is determined by price differences,
perceived risks, network comfort level, customization, information accuracy, and discomfort level (logical
distance between the consumer and the traditional retail store). Based on the Hotelling’s model of spatial
competition, Nash equilibria of price and demand are derived.
We find that the number of traditional retail store has no effect on the optimal pricing strategies of either
the online store or the traditional retail stores when the retail shops belong to one chain. Another interesting
finding is that the optimum price strategies of the channels move in the same direction at different rates as the
importance of the network comfort level changes.
This paper provides a foundation for analyzing economic aspects of businesses (electronic commerce)
on the Internet. It offers managerial insights for both online store management and retail store management
regarding issues such as marketing strategies in competition, business expansion strategies, investment
complementarity, and diseconomies of scope.

Introduction
Innovations in information technology and communication have introduced a new form of retailing known as the online store
or electronic mall. By reducing the time and other transaction costs inherent in commerce, much as mail order and cable shopping
have already begun to do, online stores are experiencing rapid growth and securing an important niche in the industry. In the
traditional retail channel, the producer sells to the wholesaler, who sells to the retailer, who sells the product to the consumer.
By contrast, the online store sells by publishing product information on the Net, taking individual orders, and shipping directly.
Online stores compete with traditional retail stores through differentiated service and pricing and compete with each other
through pricing, promotion, and product mix.
This research focuses on competition between marketing channels: an online store and traditional retail stores. We examine
the proposition that differences in discomfort level, perceived risks, customization, information accuracy, and a consumers’
network comfort level explain a consumers’ selection of a particular marketing channel. In addition, these differences explain
the variation in sales of one organizational form over another. We seek to analyze each channel’s ‘cost to advertise’ and ‘cost
to distribute’ functions in order to determine the conditions under which an online store has a competitive advantage over
traditional retail stores, and vice versa.
We find that the number of traditional retail stores has no effect on the optimal pricing strategies of either the online store
or the traditional retail stores when the traditional retail stores belong to one chain. Another interesting finding is that the
optimum price strategies of the channels move in the same direction at different rates as the cost of networking changes.
Thresholds that give complementarity or diseconomies of scale in business expansion are derived. Using these thresholds, we
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predict that the changes in a market situation are more favorable to the expansion of an online store than to that of a traditional
retail store. We also discuss social welfare implications of electronic commerce. “Electronically disadvantaged consumers” may
be worse off without proper policy intervention.

Motivation
A few years ago, not only were users of the Internet fiercely opposed to any form of commercial activity on the Net, but
the business community was basically not interested and skeptical as well. As cyberspace grows, however, most users are
beginning to accept advertising and business on the Internet, and in fact many welcome them. The Ernst & Young special report
(Ernst & Young, Jan. 1998) says that the Internet is expanding at unprecedented levels. With commercial activity on the Internet
gaining momentum, and with technological developments involving more secure means of making payments, sending
documents, and verifying the identity of the consumer, electronic stores are going to open up a new vista of opportunities.
Despite the huge growth in the commercial use of the Net, Yankee Group survey results (Eng 1995) and Ernst & Young
report (1998) show that traditional retail stores remain the primary conduit for selling products to consumers. That is, the
majority of manufactures (71%) have no intention of selling online, even though 88% of online stores believe the Net will
strengthen their competitive position relative to traditional competitors (Ernst & Young, Jan. 1998).
Why are they hesitant to jump into the electronic retailing when tens of millions people have access to the Internet? What
would stimulate these companies to join in doing business on the Net (electronic commerce)? Are they going to succeed? This
paper addresses these questions.
Like all economic institutions, the ultimate shape the marketing channel takes is determined by production and distribution
costs (Williamson 1985, 1989). The channel is united by a web of transactions among its members (ordering and shipping the
product, and remitting payment), and each transaction has a cost. In a sense then, a marketing channel has a ‘cost to distribute’
function analogous to a producer’s ‘cost to produce’ function for transforming and enlarging the product’s attributes (e.g., to
physically move the product) (Michael 1994). The consumer’s demand functions for these product attributes, coupled with the
costs of distribution and production, determine the equilibrium levels of prices and quantities in any channel, and consumers’
cost-minimizing behavior determines which channel or channels survive. The difference levels of attributes demanded by the
consumer create an opportunity for differentiated competition both within channels (e.g., among online stores) and between
channels (e.g., between online stores and retail stores).
Lusch (1982) summarizes several studies that have been conducted on the attributes that consumers use to choose stores.
Eight of the most frequently used attributes are: price, merchandise, physical characteristics, sales promotions, advertising,
convenience, services, and store personnel. Out of these eight factors, we focus on price, discomfort level, perceived risks, and
merchandise because these factors have direct impact on the consumer’s market channel selection behavior.
The Hotelling’s (1929) two-stage model of spatial competition is an extension of the Bertrand model. Hotelling uses
location and price as strategic variables to find equilibrium. In this research, we extend the simple price competition model to
price and non-price competition. In other words, we assume that two types of stores provide the same goods which are
“differentiated” in that consumers perceive different utility from the products of the different stores. The relevant questions
addressed include: What are the reasons that people use an online store rather than a traditional retail store, and vice versa? What
are the critical factors that give each type of store comparative advantages and effective marketing strategies? How much, and
in what way, does the consumer’s network comfort level or experience with information technology, especially the Internet,
impact store retailers’ strategies? What is the impact of the perceived risks on the strategies of the stores? How will technical
progresses and emerging cyber-intermediaries change the competition?

Model
This research deals with a market in which there are two supply agents (an online store and a traditional retail store) and
many consuming agents (consumers). Each consumer wants to buy at least one unit of an identical individual commodity. The
supply agents are uncertain as to whether the consumer is receiving offers from one or both of the agents at any given time.
Shopping at an online store and traditional retail store involves different transaction cost factors. In traditional retail
shopping, the transportation cost, which is a function of the distance from a consumer to a store, is a major component of
transaction cost. In online shopping, the consumer’s network comfort level and his perceived risk are the most important factors
of transaction cost. The consumer’s perceived risks center around uncertainty about the quality of the information provided about
the product and the lack of a secure environment for conducting the business transaction. Hence, a consumer’s choice of store
is determined by price differences, perceived risks, network comfort level, and discomfort level (logical distance between the
consumer and the retail store). Assume, for simplicity, that t is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and a and x are scaled
to values from 0 to 1.
Suppose a traditional retail store as store r and an online store as store e, we have consumer’s utility function like the
following:
Ue( ,x) ' U0 & 6Pe % (1 & )C % xCx>
Ur(t) ' U0 & 6Pr % tCt>
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where
U0 = consumer surplus
Pi = price of a product a store i (i = e or r)
a = network comfort level (0 # # 1)
C = network comfort level coefficient
x = perceived risks (0 # x # 1)
Cx = perceived risks coefficient
t = discomfort level (0 # t # 1)
Ct = discomfort level coefficient
The price of a product at an online store includes retail price, shipping costs, and time delay in the delivery process. Time
delay in delivery can easily be converted to a money value. For example, express delivery service minimizes the disutility of
waiting. We can consider the cost of time delay as the extra delivery charge, which is a part of the price.
Coefficients, C , Cx, and Ct, represent the importance of each variable compared to the importance of the price, 1. That is,
if the coefficient of each variable is greater than 1, the variable is more important than the price in the shopping process. If the
coefficient is less than 1, the variable plays a less important rile in the consumers’ selection processes. For example, if a
consumer considers the price as the most important factor in selecting a store, the coefficient of network comfort level, perceived
risks, and discomfort level are less than 1 and vice versa.
In order to find the optimal strategies of each store, we use the concept of pure-strategy non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
From the profit function below, we derive the best response functions of each store. A Nash equilibrium in price, a Bertrand
equilibrium, is determined from the intersection of the best response functions of the stores.
We develop a stylized framework to explore equilibrium
pricing and demand strategies of firms in the marketing channel
Max(i(Pi, Pj) ' Pid (Pi, Pj) & ci ' (Pi & bi)di % ai
i
Pi
competition between retail and online stores. The model makes it
analytically tractable to analyze the endogenous nature of
M(i
Md
retailers’ incentives and consumer’s selection behavior. We focus
' di % (Pi & bi) i ' 0
MPi
MPi
on markets where the demand for a good is dependent upon
prices, network comfort level, perceived risks, and discomfort
level. We also address business strategies through different
where j denotes its competitor
economies of scale.
Figure 1. Profit and Best Response
One of the possible advantages of the online store is the
Function of a Store i
ability to overcome the geographical limitations of a retail store.
An online store can compete with one or many retail stores which
are geographically limited and distributed. We investigate this issue under different marketing cost structures in order to identify
the best channel structure. We also examine how this expanded potential market size of the online store and the different vertical
integration structure of the retailers affect the competition.
We find that the number of retail stores has no effect on the optimal pricing strategies of either the online store or the retail
stores when the retail stores belong to one chain. Another interesting finding is that the optimum price strategies of the channels
move in the same direction at different rates as the importance of the network comfort level changes. Finally, we find that
business expansion in retailing can create more profits due to complementarity or can decrease the profit because of the
diseconomies of scale when the market holds certain thresholds.
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